Arguments out of context
Analyzing a
Rhetorical Trick Used by William Dembski
By
Jason Rosenhouse
Posted April 22, 2004
The
creationist propensity for removing quotations from their proper context has
been amply documented elsewhere.
More recently, however, they have taken to removing whole arguments from
their proper context.
Some
of the claims made by ID proponents are purely scientific. They will say, for example, that
irreducibly complex machines, by which they mean systems composed of several
well-matched, indispensable parts, can not be formed gradually via natural
selection. In reply evolutionists
point out that there certainly is no theoretical reason why such machines can
not be formed gradually, since there are a wide variety of indirect routes
through which evolution could have acted.
They also point out that for many such systems (the Krebs cycle,
circadian clock genes, the blood clotting cascade, and the immune system, among
many others) we have a great deal of evidence suggesting how they did
evolve. Further, on a small scale
we can watch the process happening, as described by Kenneth Miller in his book Finding
Darwin's God. There are also
the artificial life experiments in which irreducibly complex structures are
routinely seen to evolve by way of random variation and selection. Alternatively, an ID proponent will
argue that the "No Free Lunch" theorems of optimization theory challenge the
validity of evolution. In reply,
evolutionists show that the NFL theorems are irrelevant to assessing the
validity of evolution. They go on
to demonstrate that the hypotheses of the NFL theorem are not satisfied by the
goings-on of biological evolution.
These are purely scientific criticisms made in reply to purely
scientific claims.
But
ID proponents also make philosophical claims about how science is blinded by a
naturalistic bias. To this we
reply in kind that science is about solving problems and that naturalistic
theories are the ones that help us do that. If they could offer some reason for thinking that science
would progress by considering supernatural explanations then we would consider
them.
Then
there is the cultural aspect of ID.
Proponents of ID wish to persuade us that their motives are entirely
scientific. This question arises
in discussions of the constitutionality of teaching ID in science
classrooms. In this context it is
perfectly reasonable to point out that they clearly have religious motivations
and that in making their case they seem to prefer using the mass media to the
normal channels of scientific discourse.
And
then they go on to argue that ID is a fully scientific theory that helps us make
sense of the natural world. To
this we reply that if they are serious then we should take the next step. Having identified ID in the world, we
should ask what could be inferred about the designer from the nature of the
design. Doing so, however, forces
us to confront the problem of poor design, which casts doubt on either the
omnipotence or omnibenevolence of the designer.
And
so it goes. But nobody argues that
the religious motivations of ID proponents by themselves cast doubt on their
scientific claims. No one says
that instances of poor design mean the NFL theorems are irrelevant to
evolution. No one says that since
ID is asking us to consider supernatural explanations we should simply dismiss
out of hand their arguments against natural selection.
One
of ID's leading proponents is William Dembski. In much of his writing he has presented arguments made
against one aspect of ID as if they were intended to rebut something different. For example, in a recent essay for World
magazine, Dembski wrote:
To see how this happened, recall how exchanges
between Darwinists and the early design theorists used to go. The design
theorists would go to great lengths to analyze a given biological structure,
show why it constituted an obstacle to Darwinian and other materialistic forms
of evolution, and lay out how the structure in question exhibited clear marks
of intelligence. To such carefully drawn lines of scientific argument and
evidence, the Darwinist invariably offered stock responses, such as, "There
you go with your religion again" "You're just substituting
supernatural causes for natural causes" "You just haven't figured out
how evolution did it" "You're arguing from ignorance"
"You're lazy; get back in the lab and figure out how evolution did
it."
This essay was
written as an experiment in "future history." The editors of World asked Dembski, and several other
contributors, to hypothesize that by the year 2025 ID will have replaced
evolution. The task of the writers
was to explain how that happened.
Leaving
aside a consideration of Dembski's tone, notice how he presents arguments made
in reply to cultural and philosophical points as if they were meant to address
scientific claims. Let us consider
each of the "stock" responses Dembski mentions.
There
you go with your religion again.
It is true that evolutionists argue that ID owes far more to religion
than it does to science.
Consequently, it should not be taught in science classes. This claim is not made in reply to the
scientific arguments of ID proponents.
You're
just substituting supernatural causes for natural causes. It is indisputable that ID proponents
do, in fact, substitute supernatural causes for natural causes. This is relevant because supernatural
theories can not be tested in the lab or the field. Given this, it is difficult to see how they can plausibly be
considered scientific. Again, this
has nothing to do with the scientific claims of ID.
You're
arguing from ignorance. This
argument relates to the philosophical apparatus proposed by Dembski for
detecting design in biological organisms.
His method is purely eliminative.
Applying it would require God-like knowledge of all possible naturalistic
explanations for a given phenomenon.
Consequently, in its most charitable formulation, Dembski is simply
arguing that since no one is currently able to provide a naturalistic
explanation for a phenomenon we must chalk it up to supernatural design. This has never been a good argument in
the past. Furthermore, the problem
confronting evolutionists is the multitude of possible explanations for given
structures, not the absence of any possible explanation.
You
just haven't figured out how evolution did it. Dembski is so fond of this point, he repeated it in his
litany. The point here is the same
as in the previous paragraph. In
principle, there are many possible naturalistic explanations for biological
complexity. Chalking everything up
to design is neither warranted nor helpful.
Of
course, ID proponents do not go to great lengths to analyze biological
structures. Dembski himself has
applied his design-detection apparatus to precisely one biological structure:
the bacterial flagellum. In doing
so he described a probability calculation so transparently nonsensical that
evolutionists had no need to resort to rhetorical tricks in replying (you will
find this calculation in his book No Free Lunch). Scientists simply pointed out that
Dembski's calculation was based on numerous false assumptions, and was
consequently worthless. The only
other instance of ID proponents considering actual biological systems occurs in
the writings of Michael Behe. His
analysis consists, in its entirety, of the undisputed assertion that many
biological systems require all of their parts to function properly. This observation is hardly an example
of "carefully drawn lines of scientific argument and evidence". Dembski has exaggerated the scientific
content of ID writing and has misrepresented the arguments of ID proponents.
A
second example comes from Dembski's recent book The Design Revolution. Consider this statement:
The word "intelligent" has two meanings. It can simply refer to the activity of
an intelligent agent, even one that acts stupidly. On the other hand, it can mean that an intelligent agent acted
with skill and mastery. Failure to
draw this distinction results in confusion about intelligent design. This was brought home to me in a radio
interview. Skeptic Michael Shermer
and paleontologist Donald Prothero were interviewing me on National Public
Radio. As the discussion unfolded,
I was surprised to find that how they used the phrase "intelligent design"
differed significantly from how the intelligent design community uses it.
Shermer and Prothero understood the word intelligent
in "intelligent design" in the sense of clever or masterful design. They therefore presumed that
intelligent design must entail optimal design. The intelligent design community, on the other hand,
understands the intelligent in "intelligent design" simply as referring
to intelligent agency (irrespective of skill or mastery) and thus separates
intelligent design from optimality of design. (P. 57).
Of course, no one
thinks that ID entails optimal design.
Anyone who has ever looked at an SUV understands that something can be
designed by an intelligent agent yet not be optimal. It's not that complicated a point.
Shermer
and Prothero were simply taking Dembski seriously when he claims to want to do
actual science from an ID perspective.
Surely once you have determined that an object was designed by an
intelligent agent, it is reasonable to ask what you can infer about the
designer from the nature of the design.
As soon as we do this we are confronted with all the famous examples of
poor design in nature. They point
strongly to the sort of stupid designer Dembski admits as a possibility.
The
trouble is that ID proponents think they know who the designer is, and
stupidity is not one of His attributes.
Rather, they believe in an omnipotent, omnibenevolent designer. You would not infer such a designer
from nature alone, unless you had a prior religious commitment to such a view.
Not
only must ID proponents explain why God (let's drop the subterfuge, OK?) would
design so poorly, they must also explain why so many instances of poor design
seem to be just the sort of thing that evolution by natural selection produces
as a matter of course. The
numerous extinctions recorded in the fossil record look like simple waste as
the products of ID, but are the expected outcome of natural selection acting
over long periods of time. Our
weak back muscles are easy to understand if they evolved among creatures that
walked on their knuckles and swung through trees, but hard to understand as products
of ID.
Curiously,
old school creationists have an answer to precisely this objection. They say that the poor design we see
does not reflect God's intentions, but rather represents the influence of sin
in the world.
Dembski
hints at this solution himself:
If
we think of evolution as progressive in the sense that the capacities of
organisms get honed and false starts get weeded out by natural selection over
time, then it seems implausible that a wise and benevolent designer might want
to guide such a process. But if we
think of evolution as regressive, as reflecting a distorted moral structure
that takes human rebellion against the designer as a starting point, then it's
possible a flawless designer might use a very imperfect evolutionary process as
a means of bringing a prodigal universe back to its senses. But this is an idea to be explored in
another book. (P. 62).
Leaving aside the
fact that this makes no sense (since human rebellion happened after humans
appeared, while most of evolution happened before humans appeared, what could
it possibly mean for evolution to reflect a distorted moral structure?) it is a
blatantly religious argument and not one upon which ID proponents usually rely.
The
only alternative is to argue that the instances of poor design that we see in
nature actually reflect good design, or at least optimal design under the
circumstances. That we perceive
them as poor design reflects some deficiency in our understanding. Thus they will offer this or that
hypothesis about why backward eye-wiring is a wonderful thing or why the
panda's thumb, in fact, could not really be improved. Dembski avails himself of this option as well:
Design is a matter of tradeoffs. There's no question that we would like
to add or improve existing designs by conferring additional functionalities. It would be nice to have all the
functionality of the human eye without a blind spot. It would be nice to have all the functionality of the
respiratory and food-intake system as well as a reduced incidence of
choking. It would be nice to have
all the functionality of our backs and a decreased incidence of back pain. ...But
when the suboptimality objection is raised, one invariably finds only
additional functionalities mentioned but no details how they might be
implemented. And with design, the
devil is in the details. (P. 60).
But this simply
will not do. Not as long as we are
considering an omnipotent, omnibenevolent designer. And for an obvious reason, too. There are no constraints on omnipotence. Asking God to make our back muscles a
little stronger is not exactly like asking him to build a rock so heavy even he
can't lift it. What engineering
constraints exist are there only because God made them that way. It is a simple fact that animals endure
an enormous amount of pain and suffering every day simply because of their poor
design. And if God sometimes
intervenes to give animals a useful structure (a flagellum, say, or a blood
clotting cascade) then there is no obvious reason why He can't intervene to
prevent a poor structure from emerging.
I suspect it is these sorts of considerations that lead many people to
theistic evolution.
Thus,
disteleology is a problem for ID's because of what it seems to imply about the
designer. If ID's were serious
about turning ID into a science they would investigate this question in a
serious way. Instead they make
irrelevant arguments about suboptimal design not precluding ID.
The
scientific claims of ID proponents are false, their philosophical arguments are
nonsense, and their cultural arguments are potentially dangerous. Desperate to divert attention from this
obvious fact, they blow as much smoke as possible to distract people from the
emptiness of their claims. One
tactic they use in this regard is to misrepresent the substance of particular
anti-ID arguments. Careful reading
is required to prevent them from getting away with this.
References
Dembski, William A. "The New Age of
Information, World, April 3, 2004
Dembski, William A, The Design
Revolution, InterVarsity Press, 2004.
Dembski, William A, No Free
Lunch, Rowman and Littlefield, 2001.
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